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Well-developed financial markets are indispensable to modern
economies. It’s hard to imagine the United States and other major economic
powers without the web of financial products and instruments that connects
savers and borrowers, promoting investment and efficiency. Countries with
underdeveloped and ineffective financial markets face significant barriers
to growth and competitiveness. Indeed, higher levels of financial service
availability are generally associated with lower rates of poverty because
credit creation facilitates development (Chart 1).1
Given the importance of well-functioning financial markets, surpris-
ingly little attention has been paid to Mexico’s recent progress in laying the
foundation for a world-class financial system. A series of quiet reforms—
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many enacted in just the past few
years—points to a financial big bang
in the making. 
A prominent example is securiti-
zation, which some consider financial
innovation at its best. By pooling pre-
viously illiquid assets and selling their
future income streams to investors,
securitization unlocks value and pro-
motes a free flow of capital, spreads
risk and boosts credit availability for
consumers and businesses. Mexico
issued its first mortgage-backed secu-
rity—for $178 million—in December
2003. Since then, the market has 
expanded to approximately $1.5 bil-
lion a year, a total expected to double
over the next year, then double again
in 2008. 
This rapidly growing market for
mortgage-backed securities is a prime
example of Mexico’s success in finan-
cial development. Not long ago, finan-
cing for home purchases was scarce,
and obtaining it typically required a
down payment of 50 percent or more
for a relatively costly adjustable-rate
loan. Today, a rapidly growing num-
ber of people have access to competi-
tively priced, fixed-rate mortgages.
The development of a mortgage
industry should boost Mexico’s econo-
my by encouraging higher quality
housing, increased savings and greater
wealth creation (see the box “The Pay-
off from Mortgage-Backed Securities”).
At the same time, making it easier to
buy and sell homes will promote
household mobility, a key factor in
freeing labor resources to move from
slow-growing to more dynamic parts
of the country. 
Reforms Supporting the
Mortgage Market
Recent loan growth at Mexican
banks has been robust in the three
major categories (Chart 2).2 Consumer
lending has risen dramatically for the
past six years, albeit from a low base.
Commercial lending, largely nonexist-
ent since 1994, resumed growing in
2004, a movement expected to accel-
erate. Most remarkable, however, is










































Mortgage Lending Takes Off
Year-over-year real growth (percent)
NOTE: Some of the growth reflects purchases of existing mortgage portfolios from nonbank lenders.
SOURCE: Comisión Nacional de Bancaria y de Valores.  
Domestic credit as a percentage of GDP
NOTE: The percentages of population below the poverty line are national estimates from the CIA World Factbook. 
The definitions of poverty vary widely.
SOURCES: CIA World Factbook; International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
Percentage of population below poverty line3
the surge in home mortgage lending
that began in 2005. The upturn re-
flects a continuing trend in Mexico’s
home mortgage industry: explosive
growth in the total number of mort-
gages originated by bank and non-
bank lenders since 1999 (Chart 3). 
Compared with the previous
high-growth environment of the early
1990s, today’s lending risk is much
better contained and monitored. The
improvement results from advances in
accounting rules, capital adequacy
measures, loan classification require-
ments, and auditing and risk manage-
ment procedures—all of which now
meet or exceed international stan-
dards. Mortgage lending has seen
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In addition to freeing up funds,
reducing borrowing costs and deepen-
ing financial system penetration into the
housing sector, securitization promises
other benefits for Mexico.  
Investment opportunities. Aside
from government paper, Mexico has few
options for attractive, fixed-income
products. As a result, pension funds,
insurance companies, money managers
and other institutional investors have
limited ability to diversify their portfo-
lios. Currently, private pension funds
hold more than 80 percent of their
assets in government debt. 
Given these funds’ growth rates
and lack of diversification, mortgage-
backed securities—whose underlying
assets often carry a government guar-
antee or mortgage insurance—should
be particularly attractive. Perhaps more
important, mortgage-backed securities
typically carry an investment grade, an
important distinction in Mexico’s market
for private debt.
Macro-level risk diversification.
By isolating risk and repackaging it for
investors, securitization helps redirect
The Payoff from Mortgage-Backed Securities
financial risk to those more able to bear
it. Spreading risk helps make the finan-
cial system as a whole more stable.
Micro-level risk diversification.
The availability of a wider range of finan-
cial assets enhances institutional
investors’ ability to create stable, diversi-
fied asset portfolios, especially when
issuers can meet specific investors’
needs by varying the risk characteristics
of mortgage-backed securities. A pool of
mortgages, for example, can be grouped
by risk, so a subordinate issue absorbs
any losses before a senior interest is
affected. The subordinated debt holders
agree to greater loss exposure in
exchange for a higher return.  
Specialization. Securitization can
enhance the financial system’s special-
ization. As securitization markets develop,
specialized companies typically compete
to service financial institutions’ loan
portfolios. Institutions then have the
option of outsourcing their own portfolio
supervision, collection and customer
service operations. In the United States,
data suggest this specialization
improves loan portfolio performance.
major structural improvement within
each of the lending processes’ critical
dimensions: gauging creditworthiness,
backing loans and obtaining funds. 
Gauging creditworthiness.
Mexico has made strides in collecting
more and better information about
borrowers’ creditworthiness.  Tech-
nological improvements and the
development of reliable credit bureaus
have contributed to better manage-
ment information systems and speed-
ier loan decisions. As a result, the cost
of underwriting and originating home
mortgages has declined.
In January 2002, Mexico intro-
duced a revised legal framework for
governing credit bureau operations.
This law, coupled with supporting
bank regulation, improved the timeli-
ness of credit bureau data on the
creditworthiness of potential borrow-
ers, increased lenders’ use of credit
bureau information and strengthened
privacy protections.3 Partly because of
the new law, the depth and quality of
borrower information in Mexico now
compare favorably with that of both
regional peers and developed coun-
tries. 
El Buró de Crédito, Mexico’s most
prominent credit bureau, was the only
market participant until Círculo de
Crédito’s establishment in June 2005.
Data from these two privately owned
organizations is extensive, covering
almost 40 million individuals and 1.6
million companies, or an estimated 70
percent of potential borrowers. Such
penetration is remarkable, given that
the credit bureaus themselves have
only a 10-year history. Just as in the
United States, households and busi-
nesses are entitled to one free credit
report a year.
Backing loans. Even with abun-
dant information on borrowers, full
repayment of a loan, particularly a
long-term mortgage, is seldom
assured. For this reason, credit assur-
ances are usually sought to reduce the
expected loss should default occur. 
One such assurance involves the
mortgage itself. The home—generally
an appreciating asset—serves as col-
lateral, helping ease concerns regard-
ing default, enhancing the availability
of credit and cutting its cost. 
Mexico has made important
advances to enable the use of houses
as collateral. In 2000, bankruptcy
reform improved contract enforcement
and creditor rights by clarifying and
streamlining the process and strength-
ening lenders’ ability to repossess
assets. The collateral provisions were
further strengthened in 2003.
Generally consistent bankruptcy
rules now apply across the country,
whereas previously they varied con-
siderably from one jurisdiction to
another. Moreover, the reform estab-lished an extrajudicial mechanism for
collateral repossession and bankruptcy
resolution, alleviating the need for
lenders to access a judicial system that
at local and state levels remains ineffi-
cient and inconsistent in applying law
and precedent. With homes serving
more securely as collateral, lenders
can extend mortgages with greater
confidence.
Additional security for mortgages
has come from the establishment of
mortgage insurance, which offers
creditors protection, within limits, if
the underlying collateral doesn’t cover
a loan’s unpaid balance. A govern-
ment agency has offered mortgage
insurance since July 2005. A reform
this past March allows the private sec-
tor to provide it as well. 
The availability of mortgage
insurance opens the market to more
people and promotes the supply of
credit by lowering interest rates and
down payments. In addition, it pro-
vides an important credit enhance-
ment for Mexico’s growing mortgage-
backed securities market. Lastly, insur-
systems. Other structural changes sup-
porting securitization include uniform
underwriting standards, consistent
loan valuation standards and transpar-
ent foreclosure rules. As a result of
these efforts, Mexico’s mortgage-
backed securities market now com-
pares favorably with those of similar
countries (Table 1). 
The appetite for such securitized
products is large, especially among
Mexican institutional investors.
Because of reforms liberalizing the
industry, Mexico’s pension funds have
experienced explosive growth. Fund
managers should continue to be eager
buyers of mortgage-backed securities,
which boast investment-grade ratings,
as they continue to diversify away
from government bonds. 
However, foreign institutional
investors have been mostly absent
from the market, with the exception
of some U.S. hedge funds. For now,
the small size of Mexico’s issuances
relative to those in developed coun-
tries precludes widespread interna-
tional interest in the securities.
Problems with accurately forecasting
cash flows are another limiting factor.
Mexico’s lack of historical data
increases the difficulty of forecasting
prepayment speeds, delinquencies
and defaults. Such longer-run data will
become available over time.
Building a Mortgage Industry
While structural reform of the
financial markets has supported the
component parts of mortgage lending,
Mexico has been fostering the institu-
tions that support homebuying.
The government runs the coun-
try’s two largest mortgage lenders—
Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la
Vivienda para los Trabajadores
(Infonavit) and Sociedad Hipotecaria
Federal (SHF). 
The federal government estab-
lished Infonavit in 1972 as an
autonomous agency to manage a
workers housing fund and promote
their housing rights. Infonavit finances
mortgages for workers via a manda-
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ance makes borrowers with the high-
est loan-to-value ratios share the cost
of servicing relatively risky loans.
Obtaining funds. Once ade-
quate protections for lenders are in
place, the mortgage market still
requires the obvious: funds to lend.
Mexico has enhanced the flow of
money into home mortgage lending
through securitization. The develop-
ment of this market allows mortgage
originators to remove loans from their
books, freeing funds for new loans. 
Securitization can also lower
lenders’ cost of funds. In deciding
how to raise money, lenders may
choose between issuing debt based
on their own promise to repay or
issuing securities supported by the
future income of specific loan pack-
ages. Obtaining funds through securi-
tization often means less expensive
financing than would be possible based
on the lender’s own credit rating. 
Mexico’s first mortgage-backed
securities were issued in December
2003, following years of improve-
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Chart 3
Mortgage Originations on the Upswing
Thousands of originations
NOTE: 2006 data are through June, annualized.
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tory 5 percent payroll deduction that
also helps fund other social programs.
The agency held loans totaling $40.1
billion on June 30, the largest mort-
gage portfolio in Latin America.
Infonavit issued its first mortgage-
backed security in 2004, with $68.2
million in 12-year bonds. The agency
followed with a series of 20-year
bonds backed by low-income mort-
gage portfolios, all purchased by
Mexican institutional investors interest-
ed in long-term securities with stable,
investment-grade ratings. 
Payments on loans backing
Infonavit’s securities come via auto-
matic deductions from workers’
wages, which helps hold down delin-
quencies. The delinquency rate for
Infonavit’s initial issuance has hovered
around 2 percent, consistent with the
conservative loan origination standards
needed to meet institutional investors’
investment-grade demands.
SHF was created in 2001 to spur
development of the secondary mort-
gage market by guaranteeing credits
and creating a central database on
borrowers, loans and mortgage-backed
securitizations. The agency held $8.8
billion in directly funded home loans
at year-end 2005.
Through partial guarantees, SHF
has assumed a significant amount of
the credit risk in securitized mortgage
pools, lowering issuers’ transaction
costs and reducing the credit enhance-
ments needed to meet a particular rat-
ing standard. The Mexican govern-
ment, in turn, has explicitly guaran-
teed SHF’s obligations through 2009. 
In addition to originating mort-
gages, SHF has been a major funding
source for Mexico’s mortgage finance
companies, known by their Spanish
acronym, sofoles. Overall, 35 percent
of sofoles’ direct funding comes from
government sources. 
Although Infonavit and SHF have
been the most active in Mexico’s secu-
ritization market and maintain a domi-
nant presence in mortgages, their mar-
ket share has declined, even as the
industry has grown (Chart 4). In terms
Table 1
Top 10 Emerging-Market 
Mortgage-Backed Security Issuers
Deal value Number of
Rank (millions of U.S. $) deals
1 South Korea $9,850.4 21
2 Mexico 1,732.1 27
3 Malaysia 1,087.5 2
4 South Africa 988.4 4
5 Taiwan 729.5 5
6 China 362.3 1
7 Chile 51.1 2
8 Czech Republic 27.5 2
9 Latvia 15.0 1





















Private Sector Posts Gains in New-Mortgage Volume
Billions of pesos
NOTE: 2006 data are through June, annualized.
SOURCE:  Comisión Nacional de Fomento a la Vivienda.
NOTE: Data are for June 2004–June 2006.
SOURCE: Dealogic.Several factors are contributing to
the strong demand. Official records
put Mexico’s homeownership rate
near 90 percent, but that number is
somewhat misleading. More than 60
percent of the homes were self-con-
structed, and quality is often substan-
dard, prompting many residents to
look for new places to live. 
Demographic trends are also driv-
ing demand. In 2000, Mexicans ages
20 to 49 totaled 31 million. This popu-
lation is expected to grow to 46 mil-
lion by 2020, pulling housing demand
up along with it.
At the same time, Mexico’s mid-
dle class is expanding. Currently,
those in the lower-middle and middle
classes—households making $4,100 to
$11,000 a year—account for 45 per-
cent of the population, up 25 percent-
age points since the start of 2001. For
the past decade, wages have risen
faster than inflation, providing gains
elusive in the crisis-prone years of
1975–95. In addition, birthrates have
declined and more women are work-
ing. All these factors boost the ability
to buy a house.
Regions with high labor demand
are experiencing acute housing short-
ages, while many homes are located
in areas of limited economic opportu-
nity. Mexican businesses often fill jobs
with workers from relatively distant
locations. Given the lack of nearby
housing, groups of workers often
reside in a single apartment. 
While many of these workers are
homeowners, their houses may be
hundreds of miles from where they
work and live. They presumably
would prefer to sell their distant
homes and buy new ones closer to
work—were the homes available.
What’s more, other family members
could relocate to faster growing
regions, with their better job opportu-
nities.
Finally, the cost of home financ-
ing has dropped dramatically. Ten
years of economic stability, declining
inflation, financial market reform and
banking-sector competition have 
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of value, public institutions originated
more than 90 percent of Mexico’s
mortgages in 2002, with Infonavit
responsible for two-thirds of the total.
By June 2006, the government lenders
accounted for 63 percent of the value
of new mortgage loans. 
The government’s lost market
share has largely gone to sofoles and
banks. A comparison of their mort-
gage origination growth with that of
Infonavit and SHF shows the private-
sector institutions gaining significantly
on the government programs. 
This trend will likely continue.
SHF is phasing out mortgage origina-
tions and sofoles funding and plans to
cease both operations by 2009. To
help sofoles adjust, SHF will continue
to provide partial mortgage guaran-
tees, maintaining considerable credit
enhancement and fostering mortgage
securitization. To qualify for guaran-
tees, mortgages must meet specific
requirements for property type and
value, as well as standards for debt-to-
income and loan-to-value ratios. Such
standardization in the underwriting
process promotes homogeneity, anoth-
er characteristic that facilitates securiti-
zation. In addition to the partial guar-
antees, SHF will be more active in the
mortgage insurance market. 
Mexico’s Housing Boom
When he took office in December
2000, President Vicente Fox promised
that by the end of his term in 2006,
the number of houses built annually
would rise from 250,000 to 750,000.
Analysts expect construction of rough-
ly 800,000 units in 2006, up from
600,000 in 2005. All told, Mexico will
have built more than 3 million houses
from 2001 through 2006. 
Despite this, Mexico still has a
deficit of 5 million units, largely due
to lackluster housing stock growth in
the 1980s and ’90s. Because of the
pent-up demand, housing construction
in Mexico will probably continue at a
fast pace, with as many as 1 million




unsung, development in Mexico is
the growth of a vigorous financial
derivatives exchange. 
Before the 1998 creation of
MexDer, the country’s organized
exchange for derivatives con-
tracts, Mexico had about 100
years’ experience with unregulat-
ed, over-the-counter derivatives.
These mostly consisted of mature
foreign exchange and interest rate
derivatives.
MexDer activity was anemic
before 2001, when ongoing gov-
ernment efforts to develop a full
yield curve for peso-denominated
debt finally began to bear fruit.
Since then, MexDer has experi-
enced strong growth in interest
rate futures and foreign exchange
swaps. By 2004, MexDer had
become the fifth most active
futures exchange worldwide and
the third most active for short-
term interest rate futures. 
In 2004, the exchange
expanded its equity-related busi-
ness by initiating trade in stock
options, stock futures and index
options. Mexico’s relatively small
equity market has yet to spawn
much growth in these types of
derivatives. Still, the impressive
development of Mexico’s deriva-
tives market overall offers another
example of the type of quiet
reforms that are creating a world-
class financial system.greatly enhanced lenders’ ability to
offer longer-term loans at reasonable
rates. 
In September 2006, banks were
offering fixed-rate, 20-year mortgages
at roughly 9 percent, with a required
down payment of 10 percent. Just two
years earlier, the same mortgage
would have carried an interest rate of
18 percent and required a 35 percent
down payment.
Toward Modern Financial Markets 
Mexico’s step-by-step creation of
the institutional infrastructure for
mortgage lending illustrates how
many interconnecting parts are need-
ed for just one segment of a modern
financial system. While improving
mortgage finance, Mexico has adopted
other financial sector reforms. Since
1998, for example, the country has
established a more formal infrastruc-
ture for trading derivatives—financial
instruments whose value is tied to the
performance of interest rates, currency
values, stocks or other assets (see the
box “Derivatives in Mexico”).
Mexico has also bolstered confi-
dence in corporate finance. As recent-
ly as 1998, the country issued no cor-
porate bonds, and lending to the pri-
vate sector had fallen to less than half
its 1994 level. Now Mexican compa-
nies acquire financing of more than
$10 billion annually from bonds, and
bank lending is advancing rapidly. 
Mexico implemented corporate
governance standards for securities-
rating agencies in January 2006. The
new rules include an industry code of
conduct and stronger measures to
ensure the confidentiality of financial
data and other sensitive information.
These reforms bring the country in
line with international standards,
increase investor confidence in agen-
cies’ opinions and recommendations,
and boost bonds’ marketability. 
Legislation passed this year is
facilitating the development of a mar-
ket for real estate investment trusts
(REITs), promising greater access to
funds for the real estate sector
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overall.4 The legislation changed tax
laws, with the goal of stimulating real
estate investment by enhancing liquid-
ity and diversification opportunities,
while opening the real estate market
to small investors. The first Mexican
REIT was issued in March 2006.
The creation of modern financial
markets will have wide-ranging effects
on the economy. By freeing up funds,
reducing borrowing costs and deepen-
ing the financial system, Mexico’s
emerging mortgage-lending industry is
already helping boost both the quanti-
ty and quality of the housing stock.
A possible longer-term benefit
involves the country’s still large infor-
mal economy, in which individuals
and businesses operate outside official
regulations. Monthly incomes as low
as $420 qualify formal-sector house-
holds—which pay taxes—for govern-
ment-originated loans (Chart 5). 
The opportunity to obtain mort-
gage financing may represent a sub-
stantial incentive to report personal
income and pay social security taxes.
Over time, such a process could lead
to a more inclusive formal economy
in Mexico, coinciding with a continu-
ing rise in the middle class. 
The rapidly expanding home
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Chart 5
Who Qualifies for Mortgages?
SOURCE: Comisión Nacional de Fomento a la Vivienda.
The creation of modern
financial markets will have
wide-ranging effects on the
economy.Mexico’s economic well-being in
many other ways. The homestead is
the primary savings vehicle for most
Mexican families. With financing
scarce in the past, the only way for
many to save was one brick at a time,
with the construction of their home
spread over many years. Today, with
greater access to mortgage credit, a
growing number of households have
the option of purchasing a completed
house and paying for it over time—a
process offering better shelter while
allowing for the gradual accumulation
of equity.
The flip side of enabling more
people to purchase fully constructed
homes is that those wishing to sell
them should find that easier, too. This
could reduce the tendency for people
to find themselves tethered to a region
by the untappable wealth accumulated
in their home.
While families have often circum-
vented this problem by sending a
breadwinner to live wherever work
could be found, the ability to relocate
families to regions offering better jobs
may enable more Mexicans to
improve themselves financially. By
creating a more liquid housing market,
the country’s expanding mortgage
market may reduce labor market
rigidities as well, contributing to a
more dynamic Mexican economy.
Skelton is an international financial analyst
in the Financial Industry Studies Department
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 For more on financial development’s role in
economic growth, see Saving Capitalism from
the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial
Markets to Create Wealth and Spread
Opportunity, by Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi
Zingales, New York: Crown Business, 2003, and
“Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be
Right,” by Robert G. King and Ross Levine,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, August
1993, pp. 717–37. 
2 For more on Mexico’s booming credit market,
see “Mexico Emerges from 10-Year Credit
Slump,” by Robert V. Bubel and Edward C.
Skelton, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Southwest Economy, May/June 2005, pp. 14–18.
3 This law gave rise to the banking regulation
seemingly most responsible for the increased
use of credit bureau information. This regulation
required a 100 percent capital reserve for loans
made without consulting credit bureau informa-
tion. The regulation was subsequently reformed
so that credit extended to borrowers with a nega-
tive credit history would also require the 100
percent reserve coverage. Moreover, creditors
are required to update information on their bor-
rowers every month.
4 A REIT, which often is publicly traded, holds
the titles to real estate property and mortgages
for the benefit of a large group of investors. A
REIT is exempt from corporate income taxes as
long as nearly all its income is distributed to the
trust’s investors.
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